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"Fair Market Value," "Just
Compensation," and the Constitution:
A Critical View
W. Harold Bigham*
Fair market value is... the amount of money which a purchaser willing but not
obligated to buy the property would pay to an owner willing but not obligated to sell
it, taking into consideration all uses to which the land was adapted and might in
reason be applied.'
'[M]arket value' is not an end in itself, but merely a means to an end, the ultimate
object being the ascertainment of "just compensation." Ordinarily, where the value
of the land is to be ascertained, and it is of such kind and so situated as to be
available for sale in the ordinary course of dealing, market value is perhaps the best
test and under such circumstances is generally adopted.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
It has become almost an article of faith that "fair market value"
constitutes the only fair and workable measure of damages for a
landowner whose real property has been taken for public use. 3 The courts
apply it woodenly;' the magic words are solemnly intoned to jurors,
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A., 1954, University of the South; J.D., 1960,
Vanderbilt University.
The writer is a member of a land condemnation commission appointed under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 71(A)(h) by the former chief judge of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee, the Honorable William E. Miller, now a member of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The views expressed herein are not those of the Commission,
nor, to the extent that they reflect variations from existing law, do they represent the principles
applied by the author in the carrying out of his duties as a member of the Commission, under the
explicit instructions of the court. This paper was prepared, in part, under the terms of a grant from
the Urban and Regional Development Center of Vanderbilt University and the author gratefully
acknowledges the help and encouragement of the Center.
I. 4 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.2[l] (rev. 3d ed. J. Sackman 1962)
(footnotes omitted).
2. Id. § 12.2 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Berger & Rohan, The Nassau County Study: An
Empirical Look into the Practices of Condemnation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 430 (1967); Hershman,
Compensation-Just and Unjust, 21 Bus. LAW 285 (1966).
3. See, e.g., Crouch, Valuation Problems and Procedures Under Eminent Domain, in
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION NATIONAL INSTITUTE, CONDEMNATION, COMPENSATION AND THE
COURTS 31 (1969); Dolan, Just Compensation: Indemnity or Market Value?, 34 APPRAISAL J. 353
(1966); MacLeod, Adequacy of Compensation in Condemnation, 31 APPRAISAL J. 477 (1963);
Sengstock & McAuliffe, What is the Price of Eminent Domain?, 44 J. URBAN L. 185 (1966).
4. "For purposes of the compensation due under the Fifth Amendment, of course, only that
'value' need be considered which is attached to 'property,' but that only approaches by one step the
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commissioners, and arbitrators. 5 Even the learned scholars in the field
problem of definition. The value of property springs from subjective needs and attitudes; its value to
the owner may therefore differ widely from its value to the taker. Most things, however, have a
general demand which gives them a value transferable from one owner to another." Kimball
Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949). See also United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson,
319 U.S. 266 (1943); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943); McCandless v. United States,
298 U.S. 342 (1936); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934); United States v. New River
Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341 (1923); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299 (1923).
5. A fair example, and a correct statement of the law, is the following extract from the
Instructions to Commissioners given by Judge William E. Miller.
"The method by which to determine the just compensation to be paid to the property
owner for the taking of a part of his property is, as a general rule, to compare the fair market
value of the property before and after the taking; that is to say, by subtracting the fair market
value of what remains after the taking from the fair market value of the whole immediately
before the taking.
"Just compensation is not a question of the value of the property in question to the
defendant, on the one hand, nor its value to the Government on the other. Therefore, in
determining the fair market value of the property in question on the date of taking you shall
not consider or be influenced by the fact that the United States needs the property or that these
proceedings are pending, nor shall you consider or in any way be influenced by the fact that the
United States is able and willing to pay for the property or that the defendant is or may be
unwilling to sell. It would be improper for you to permit such matters to affect your findings.
"In every condemnation proceeding the problem is to determine what the property owner
has lost as a result of the taking, and not what the Government may have gained.
"Just compensation is intended to cover the loss caused the owner by the taking of his
property for public use and not the value of the property as applied to the public use. How
much the property taken may be worth to the public for those purposes to which it will be
applied is not to be considered by you in any way in arriving at the fair market value of the
property at the date of the taking by the Government.
"So, in determining fair market value at the time of the taking, you are not to consider
the fact that the Government intends to take the land; instead you are to fix the fair market
value on the date of taking at a time immediately before the taking, without regard either to
the imminency of the taking or the pendency of any proceedings to take the land.
"In determining the fair market value of the estate or interest taken, you may not
consider the Government's need for the property, nor whether or not the defendant owner
wanted to sell it. Your task is to find what was the fair market value of the tract involved in
this trial, as of the time of the taking, uninfluenced in any way by either the necessities of the
Government or the wishes or wants or desires of the owners.
"By fair market value is meant the price in cash or its equivalent that the property would
have brought at the time of the taking, considering its highest and most profitable use, if then
offered for sale in the open market in competition with other similar properties at or near the
location of the property, with a reasonable time allowed to find a purchaser.
"You are to assume that the purchaser in such a transaction was desirous of buying the
property, but not forced to buy, and that the seller was desirous of selling the property, but not
forced to sell; and that both buyer and seller were fully informed on that date as to all
circumstances and factors favorable and unfavorable with respect to the property, and as to all
uses to which the property was then being put, and as to the highest and best use and all other
uses for which the property was at that time actually and potentially suitable and adaptable.
"In arriving at your estimate of fair market value, you should take into account all factors
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give it at least implicit recognition. 6 Moreover, it continues to flourish
despite widespread public dissatisfaction with both the substantive test
for damages and the procedures through which the land is obtained. 7 The
taking of private property for the federal interstate highway and urban
renewal programs, for example, has left a trial of unhappy landowners
who have lost all faith in the ability or willingness of government to deal
fairly with its citizens.
The discontent with existing condemnation compensation practices
stems from the failure of condemning authorities using the fair market
Value test to make whole those who are forced to give up their property
for public use.8 The fifth amendment's command that "private property
which could fairly be suggested by the seller to increase the price paid, and all counter-
arguments which the buyer could fairly make to reduce the price to be paid by him, to the
extent that you believe such matters would have been considered in the bargaining as to price.
Your determination is to be made in the light of all facts affecting value as shown by the
evidence, together with any facts which, although not shown by the evidence, are of such
general knowledge in the community as not to require proof." (Judge Miller's order of in-
struction is retained on file in the federal district court for the Middle District of Tennessee.)
6. E.g., AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS, CONDEMNATION APPRAISAL
PRACTICE 4-8 (1961); L. ORGEL. VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 11-15, 17
(2d ed. 1953).
7. Even the courts recognize the hardship. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373, 382 (1945); City of Newark v. Cook, 99 N.J. Eq. 527, 538, 133 A. 875, 879 (Ch. 1926).
During 1963 and 1964, hearings were conducted around the country by the Select
Subcommittee on Real Property Acquisition of the Committee of Public Works of the United
States House of Representatives. These hearings, dealing with real property acquisition practices
and adequacy of compensation in federal and federally assisted programs, revealed a deep, pervasive
distrust of governmental motives and practices in land acquisition programs. See Hearings on Real
Property Acquisition Practices and Adequacy of Compensation in Federal and Federally Assisted
Programs Before the Select Subcomm. on Real Property Acquisition of the House Comm. on
Public Works, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). The study, a considerable portion of which is
reproduced in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, REAL ESTATE VALUE IN CONDEMNATION 255-98 (1969),
points out that present practices are not doing substantial justice to the condemnees, and it suggests
that the market value standards limiting compensation to the value of the property taken were
adopted by the courts in a comparatively uncomplicated time in our nation's history when land was
plentiful and government acquisitions skirted cities and by-passed homes and businesses, causing
few displacements and relatively little damage. The gist of the report is that it is the responsibility of
the Congress to determine whether other losses suffered by public owners or tenants should be
absorbed by the public. See also Slaritt, More Inequities and Injustices of Condemnation Practice,
43 CONN. B.J. 89 (1969).
8. For a vivid description of the adverse psychological effect see Fried, Grieving for a Lost
Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation in J. WILSON, URBAN RENEWAL: THE RECORD AND THE
CONTROVERSY 359 (1966). See also Weisl & Cohen, Federal Condemnation Law and the Public
Interest, in 1968 INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN 45. Not all of the dissatisfaction, however, lies
with the landowners. Governmental officials sometimes believe that the public is forced to pay more
for the property than is fair. See, e.g., United States v. Merchants Matrix Cut Syndicate, Inc., 219
F.2d 90 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 945 (1955); United States v. 0.84 Acres of Land, 112 F.
Supp. 828 (N.D. Cal. 1953). Then, too, courts themselves are becoming aware that present
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[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation" has been
construed to mean that the condemnor must pay only for the property
taken. The adoption of the fair market value standard for valuing
property, coupled with judicial interpretation of the terms "property"
and "taken," has resulted in denial of recovery for sundry incidental
damages. For instance, compensation is not allowable for the unwill-
ingness of the owner to part with his property, 9 the loss of business or
future profits, 10 the frustration of the owner's plans, loss of opportuni-
ties, or other so-called consequential or indirect damages."
Although the fair market value test has been widely utilized,
another view of the extent of the government's obligation to the
dispossessed landowner may reasonably be evolved from an
accommodation of the constitutional power of eminent domain and the
constitutional right to just compensation. This is the theory that the
landowner has the right to be made whole-to be put in as good a
pecuniary position as he would have been in if his property had not been
taken.12 This approach, known pejoratively as the "indemnity theory,"
frames the question in terms of "what has the owner lost, not what has
the taker gained."' 3 When the interests of society are balanced against
those of the condemnee, it seems clear that there is no compelling
justification for not completely indemnifying the landowner for his loss.
The object of the fifth amendment's just compensation clause is to effect
a distribution of certain losses inflicted by public improvements among
the public generally rather than upon those whose property is taken."4 It
condemnation practices and damage-measuring procedures do not even approximate the rendering
of justice:
"In this era of the law explosion no phase of judicial administration is more ripe for
reform than eminent domain valuation. Trial judges, lawyers and appraisers are willy-nilly
players in a super-charged psychodrama designed to lure twelve mystified citizens into a
technical decision transcending their common denominator of capacity and experience. The
victor's profit is often less than the public's cost of maintaining the court during the days and
weeks of trial." State v. Wherity, 275 Cal. App. 2d 279, 290, 79 Cal. Rptr. 591, 598 (Ct. App.
1969) (Friedman, J., dissenting).
9. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369 (1943).
16. Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923); Bothwell v. United
States, 254 U.S. 231 (1920); United States v. Honolulu Plantation Co., 182 F.2d 172 (9th Cir.
1950).
11. See generally United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); Mitchell v. United
States, 267 U.S. 341 (1925).
12. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
13. Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston, 217 U.S. 189, 195 (1910).
14. There are many losses to redistribute. For example, the cost of the rights of way on the
41,000 mile interstate highway system has been conservatively estimated to be 5 billion dollars.
H.R. Doc. No. 300, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 6 (1958).
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is sometimes said that the law does not require the condemnee to bear
more than his fair share of the burden of the public improvement for
which his land is being taken. To the extent that the existing use of the
fair market value test prohibits compensation for consequential
damages, however, the landowner's compensation is inadequate, and he
is in fact paying more than his fair share.
While it is recognized that a few state and federal statutes have
provided some relief from the procrustean bed that is the test of fair
market value, it is the thesis of this article that the time is rapidly
approaching when merely peripheral and palliative remedies will no
longer suffice to suppress the widely-held view that government is
unconstitutionally refusing to "pay the piper" in its public operations
requiring the taking of private property. The purpose of this article is to
consider the areas in which it appears that the "fair market value" test
fails to give the condemnee "just compensation" and to suggest
procedural reforms in condemnation administration. Additionally,
alternative valuation standards will be examined through a review of the
expropriation procedures of several foreign countries.
II. "FAIR MARKET VALUE" AND THE RELUCTANT LANDOWNER
A. In General
With respect to the fifth amendment's prohibition against the
taking of property without just compensation, former Attorney General
Ramsey Clark has said: "There is no more vital concept in the
Constitution, for it protects the citizen in his property, and freedom
cannot exist in a propertyless state. Property affords the opportunity for
the exercise of liberty."' 5 It is an axiom of basic property law that the
ownership of real property involves a bundle of rights. If the government
is to compensate for only a portion of the bundle, then it should be
forthright enough to admit it. If the courts believe that the Constitution
requires only that government pay what it can afford for public-use
property, it would be less of an irritation for them to say so than to
continue to mouth pious incantations about "fair market value." At the
same time, however, "there is as much, if not more, need for thoughtful
consideration to be given as to how best the entire public interests can be
protected as there is for concern about the individuals whose property is
acquired for public use." 16 One has little patience or sympathy, for
15. Attorney General Clark's statement is reprinted in WeisI & Cohen, Federal
Condemnation Law and the Public Interest, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH INSTITUTE ON
EMINENT DOMAIN 45 (1968).
16. Weisl & Cohen, supra note 15, at 51.
1970]
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instance, with the kind of grasping landowner described in United
States v. Merchants Matrix Cut Syndicate, Inc.:
All too frequently, profit seeking motives creep into condemnation cases. This
observation, no doubt, will be distasteful to those who envisage the public treasury
as fair game in such proceedings. Though competitive existence in our society may
stimulate such desires, just compensation, only, remains the yardstick in eminent
domain proceedings.
7
Lack of public planning18 and failure to anticipate the need for public
property can result in apparent raids on the public treasury, particularly
when the value of land is steadily appreciating.
With the foregoing perspective, the discussion now turns to some of
those areas in which the fair market value test results not only in an
inability to do substantial justice, but also in a failure to meet the
constitutional imperative of "just compensation."
B. Disruption, Disturbance, and Demoralization
The definition of "fair market value" assumes valuation based on
the "highest and best use"' 9 to which the property can be put as of the
date of taking. At least at this point it is clear, however, that the
condemnee is not constitutionally entitled to compensation for the
incidental taking of his business. Since the landowner presumably can
carry on his business elsewhere, a requirement that the condemning
authority "pay for the business" would result in an exorbitant
condemnation value. Moreover, since the property's highest potential is
a factor in determining market value, and since the present use of the
property may represent its highest potential, it has been argued that the
landowner is, in fact, indirectly compensated for the loss of his
business. 0 If, for example, the landowner is using the property to operate
a service station, and if the property would be valued higher in the
market place for that than for any other potential use, then the
landowner's compensation should make him whole since the value of the
service station is included in the valuation of the land. This reasoning,
however, ignores damages attributable to such factors as business
17. 219 F.2d 90, 98 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 945 (1955). Anthony Lewis has recently
described, from his English perspective, the unhappy experiences of public officials in their attempt
to obtain the so called "Burling Park" on the Virginia palisade of the Potomac in Fairfax, Virginia.
Lewis, The Making of a Park, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1970, at 41, col. I (city ed.).
18. For a description of the pervasive effect of long-range planning of land use patterns in
England see text accompanying notes 65-67 infra.
19. For an excellent discussion of "highest and best use" see Crouch, A Perspective Look at
Highest and Best Use, 34 APPRAISAL J. 166 (1966).
20. See, e.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
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interruption, the loss of going concern value and goodwill when the busi-
ness cannot relocate without a substantial loss of its patronage, the loss
of ability to continue in business when there is inadequate capital or
credit to finance a new operation, the loss of the services of an elderly
proprietor or others with inadequate training or health to withstand the
competitive pressures and risks of relocation, transportation costs and
expenses of search for replacement property, and costs of moving
personal property and dismantling and reinstalling machinery and
equipment. Claims for expenses incident to the taking of property have,
nevertheless, been regularly rejected on the grounds that they are too
speculative, that they confuse the issue, or that consideration of the
property's "highest and best use" necessarily includes these elements of
damage .2 These objections all reflect skepticism of the expedience of a
"value to the owner" standard, which, it is argued, is not only
administratively infeasible but gives the landowner a windfall at the
expense of society in general. Very frequently, however, the unarticulated
reason that proof of "value to the owner" damages for loss of business is
rejected can be traced to a basic lack of faith in the ability of the trier of
fact to arrive at a rational result in the face of confusingly large amounts
of data.
Few would deny that land is often "worth" more to a particular
landowner than it is to anyone else. It is certainly not difficult to
conclude that the fair market value test creates substantial injustice when
the family homestead is being taken and no replacement property is
available, or when a black or poor white family has paid off a home in a
ghetto and cannot find comparable shelter for the small price they
receive for their home. There is a certain lack of persuasiveness to the
argument that the trier of fact, even with proper instructions, cannot
measure the value of these factors when triers of fact regularly assess and
award damages for such obviously subjective ailments as pain and
mental anguish.
The existence of the problems described has been recognized and
21. Id. For many years in England a landowner was entitled in an eminent domain proceeding
to receive the value of the land to him. G. CHALLIES, THE LAW OF EXPROPRIATION 87 (2d ed. 1963).
Similarly there has been recognition, in Canada and elsewhere, that a condemnee is entitled to a
premium merely because he is an unwilling seller. See, e.g., Lock v. Furze, 19 C.B. (N.S.) 96 (1865);
In re Wilkes' Estate, 16 Ch. D. 597 (1880). In recent years the Congress of the United States has
given statutory recognition to the legitimacy of such claims. For an excellent discussion of federal
statutes of this nature see Note, The Interest in Rootedness: Family Relocation and an Approach to
Full Indemnity, 21 STAN. L. REV. 801 (1969). See also PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE. REAL ESTATE
VALUATION IN CONDEMNATION 191-253, 301-405 (1969). With regard to state condemnations,
however, the picture is much less attractive.
19701
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discussed, not in terms of constitutional prerequisites, but in terms of
pure utilitarianism.2 The constitutional issues, however, are clearly the
same, and the following balance of these interests should be persuasive as
to constitutional requirements as well. If society makes the pragmatic
decision that the total loss suffered by the landowner whose business or
home is taken for public projects, including expenses of replacing the
taken property, outrage and anger at the governmental taking and any
other tangible or intangible but measurable loss is so great that it
outweighs the public benefit of the acquisition, then the public project
should be abandoned or compensation should be made for all of the loss.
If the loss remains uncompensated, society must suffer what Professor
Michelman calls the demoralization costs.23
III. FAIR MARKET VALUE AND PROCEDURAL DIFFICULTIES
In assessing the fairness of the "fair market value" approach, the
difficulties that have arisen in the procedural application of substantive
condemnation principles cannot be ignored. There is, for example, a
constant struggle between condemning agencies and landowners over
who should be the trier of fact. Condemnees and their attorneys are
convinced that substantially more in the way of an award can be
obtained from a jury than from a judge or a commission. Not only is
there no empirical proof for this proposition, the available evidence
indicates that the factual confusion that attends the trial of eminent
domain cases is much more likely to result in a lower award from a jury
of laymen than from a judge or an experienced and sophisticated
22. Perhaps the best known discussion is Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165
(1967). See also Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Law, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63; Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some
Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L. REv. 755 (1963); Kratovil &
Harrison, Eminent Domain-Policy and Concept, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 596 (1954). For cases dealing
with the balancing concept see Malman v. Village of Lincolnwood, 61 Ill. App. 2d 55, 208 N.E.2d
884 (1965) and Rochester Business Institute Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 App. Div. 2d 97, 267
N.Y.S.2d 274 (1966).
23. Michelman, supra note 22. A very plausible argument can be made that, even if we are to
adhere to the "fair market value" test as a constitutionally sufficient standard for governmental
expropriations, when quasi-public agencies such as utilities, railroads and universities are granted
the power of eminent domain, all losses must be compensated. The exception would be justifiable on
the ground that, although the quasi-public agencies are serving a vital public function, they are
nevertheless profit-making organizations whose publicly established rate structures can be, and are,
adjusted to give a reasonable return on investment. It is considerably more difficult, however, to
explain why "just compensation" is not the same in both cases, since the fifth amendment addresses
itself specifically to the government's deprivations.
[Vol. 24
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commission or arbitration tribunal.24 Regardless of the form of the
tribunal or the procedure adopted, however, the fact that the goal is the
establishment of "fair market value" inevitably renders the proceeding
chaotic.?
A. The "Comparable Sales" Dilemma
The courts frequently refer to "comparable sales" as the "best
evidence" of market value.26 Presumably, evidence of comparable sales
provides the least confusing guide to market value, and the definiteness
and ascertainability of such evidence lends an air of objectivity to the
testimony of the appraiser-experts. If the sales are in fact
"comparable," they are excellent indicators of the value of the subject
property. A free and open sale of the same property, not too remote in
time, would in fact be the best evidence of the fair market value of the
property as of the date of taking, but this is a happy situation not
frequently encountered. Several difficult problems attend the utilization
of comparable sales data.
In the first place, with the possible exception of very unattractive
subdivision tracts, no two pieces of property are exactly alike. 2 Almost
24. See L. WALLSTEIN, REPORT ON LAW AND PROCEDURE IN CONDEMNATION (1932). A
Massachusetts study described in Note, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment:
Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61, 73, 87 (1957), suggested that jury trials usually do not
materially increase the amount available to the property owner over what he would have obtained in
a settlement. On the other hand, there are many cases in which juries appear to have acted
arbitrarily to give compensation for incidental losses, despite directions to the contrary. E.g.,
Reeves v. City of Dallas, 195 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946).
25. It has been suggested that the price of "splitting the difference," generally followed in the
trial of eminent domain cases before juries, makes it possible "to adjust the rigid rules of law to the
requirements of justice and indemnity in each particular case." Park Comm'n v. United States, 143
F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1944), quoting L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN
810, 837 (lst ed. 1936). It seems more likely that dispensing this kind of "fireside equity" will result
in injustice.
26. See United States v. 329.05 Acres of Land, 156 F. Supp. 67, 71 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), affd
sub nom. United States v. Kooperman, 263 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1959) ("Is]ales of the same property
or those of a comparable character in the same neighborhood in recent times constitute the best
evidence upon which to establish value in a condemnation proceeding"). See also, United States v.
5139.5 Acres of Land, 200 F.2d 659 (4th Cir. 1952); United States v. 70.39 Acres of Land, 164 F.
Supp. 451 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Dolan, Federal Condemnation Practice-General Aspects, 27
APPRAISAL J. 15 (1959).
27. There are inadequacies in the market data technique. These have been summarized from
an appraiser's perspective as follows:
"1. Sales are historical evidences of past actions in the market.
"2. The essence of value is the relationship between people and property. The actual
transactions reflect not only the influence of the individual property but also the personalities
and motives of the buyer and seller. The probable behavior and performance of individuals is
not subject to exact prediction.
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all eminent domain proceedings are afflicted with unseemly wrangles
about the comparability of the sales being used. The sales may not be
comparable, for example, because of their geographical distance from
the subject property and their remoteness in time from the date of
taking.? It may even develop that there have been no sales of comparable
property within reasonable geographical and calendar proximity. The
introduction of evidence of comparable sales, therefore, may lead to trial
of collateral issues, and the absence of evidence of comparable sales may
leave the trier of fact hopelessly uninformed. Moreover, since almost
every allegedly qualified appraiser has a different concept of what is
meant by a comparable sale, the use of comparable sales data often
results in compromise awards somewhere between the highest and lowest
appraisal, without any real reference to the intrinsic value of the
property. The use of the comparable sales approach to arrive at "fair
market value" has been recently characterized in uncomplimentary
terms:
It is advanced herein that the dual tendency of the courts to limit the
presentation of market value to the comparative sales approach and to label this
method the 'best evidence' constitutes an unwarranted and often erroneous simpli-
fication of the value problem. Such an approach is blind to the advancement of
appraising techniques and, more so, to the marketplace. In an effort to achieve
expediency and simplicity, it reconstructs a Procrustean bed; if the subject does not
fit comfortably-and with comparative ease-upon the ready-made bed, then the
victim's head or feet are cut down to the convenient size ...
Buying and selling in the mid-twentieth century is far different in the
marketplace from the way it is viewed from the courthouse.2
Considerable controversy has raged over the years on the question
"3. No comparison can be expected to furnish the exact dollar value for the subject property
"4. There are differences in physical similarities in market circumstances in the 'justified'
and 'actual' sales. Distinction between the two must be recognized in their respective
interpretation of the fair market value ....
"5. The mathematically adjusted indications are not true market conditions. They are
unrealistic and conjectural based on ephemeral assumptions and not reflective of true market
conditions.
"6. Each property has its own specifics, individuality, character and capacity. No two pieces
of property are alike ....
"7. The assignment of percentage values to each of the factors can become arbitrary,
unrealistic, and theoretical in nature and relegates itself under the realm of mysticism.
"8. Piecemeal adjustments by mathematical percentages of the so-called 'comparables' tend
to invalidate the composite evidentiary picture of the transactions by increasing the chances for
error or judgment by omission or exception." Lum, Comparison and Use of Market Data in
Preparation for Expert Testimony, 31 APPRAISAL J. 178, 181 (1963).
28. For a general discussion of the comparability problem see Sengstock & McAuliffe, What
Is the Price of Eminent Domain?, 44 J. URBAN L. 185, 197-206 (1966).
29. 3 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP., RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES A-25 to -26 (1961).
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of whether sales of comparable property made subsequent to the date of
taking should be considered in arriving at fair market value.30 The most
frequently cited criticism of the use of this evidence is that the
condemnation proceedings often cause an increase in property values in
the vicinity, with the result that subsequent sales may not accurately
reflect the value of the subject property at the exact date of its taking,
which is the only proper time for the fixing of value. The short answer to
this argument is that adjustments are necessary in order to make
evidence of comparable sales usable, whether they occur before or after
the date of taking. If conditions have been changed to the extent that the
sale can no longer be said to be "comparable," then evidence of the sale
can be excluded for that reason alone. As the California Law Revision
Commission recently pointed out:
Not only is the admission of subsequent sales justified on the ground that they
indicate what the value would have been on the date of taking, but they are
especially important when prior sales are (1) few in number or (2) considerably more
remote on the date of taking than are the subsequent salees. Furthermore,
subsequent sales may indicate a trend in the market.3'
When a public works project is of any magnitude, such as a dam
and reservoir, an interstate highway, or an urban renewal project, the
failure of condemning authorities and their appraisers to be consistent
and uniform in their offers can create great difficulty. Public
dissatisfaction with apparent unequal treatment inevitably results since
there is no practical means by which the confidentiality of the
condemnor's offers can be maintained. Notwithstanding the apparent
inequities of inconsistent offers, the overwhelming majority of the cases
exclude from evidence testimony of both offers made and sales amounts
actually paid to other condemnees for similar property in the project
areas,3 2 no matter how comparable in terms of geography, time, and
potential use. Three reasons are normally assigned for refusing to admit
evidence of such sales. First, the sale is not, by definition, a voluntary
sale in a free and open market. Secondly, in partial taking cases the
condemnor's sales price may include not only the value of the property
taken but damages for remaining property as well. Finally, the
admission of evidence of other sales in the project area would allegedly
introduce "aggravating and time-consuming collateral issues tending to
30. See, e.g., Old Dominion Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55 (1925); United States v.
Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 168 F.2d 391 (2d Cir. 1948); County of Los Angeles v. Hoe, 138 Cal.
App. 2d 74, 291 P.2d 98 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Dolan, supra note 26.
31. 3 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP., RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES A-37 (1961).
32. See 5 P. NICHOLS, supra note 1, §§ 21.3[1], .4[l]; I L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 147 (2d ed. 1953); Annot., 174 A.L.R. 386 (1948).
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promote confusion rather than clarity." '3 3 These reasons are not
persuasive. Although sales to the condemnor are not "voluntary," there
should at least be an element of estoppel working against the
condemnor's attempt to resist admission of evidence of such sales. This
would not place an undue burden on the condemnor, since any attempt
on the part of landowners' appraisers to rely on sales to the condemnor
could be attacked through cross-examination on the basis that different
conditions rendered the sales not comparable. Moreover, it does not
seem that review of the condemnor's explanation for inconsistent sales
prices would involve the court in the examination of collateral issues. On
the other hand, the admission of proof of these sales would have the
salutary effect of compelling the condemnor, on pain of having his
failure to do so disclosed in open court, to deal with similarly situated
landowners on a fair and uniform basis.u
Much of what has been said about sales to condemnors can also be
said about so-called "forced sales." Evidence of sales of comparable
property by an executor or administrator, foreclosure sales, sales to
settle estates, and any other sales made under legal duress or coercion, is
not admissible.35 As soon as it appears that the sale falls into one of these
categories, the trier of fact may not hear about it, even though it may
have been conducted in a free and open manner, even including an
auction sale. No satisfactory explanation has been given why the
appraiser could not adjust for the forced nature of the sale as he does for
geographical or temporal disparities. Both sides have experts who are
free to question the alleged comparability of sales. It is the height of
folly, therefore, to refuse to allow the trier of fact to hear of a foreclosure
auction sale, in connection with a foreclosure, of property adjacent to the
taken property, made only a day or two prior to the date the subject
property is taken, and conceded by an objective, experienced appraiser to
have been fair in every respect. After all, there is an element of necessity
connected with all sales, even those made in the ordinary course of
business.
36
Finally, offers to buy or to sell property, including the subject
33. Blick v. Ozaukee County, 180 Wisc. 45,48, 192 N.W. 380, 381 (1923).
34. At least one state has recently held that evidence of sales to the condemnor is admissible
to prove value, notwithstanding the coercion allegedly inherent in such transactions. See County of
Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957).
35. See, e.g., Redevelopment Land Agency v. 61 Parcels of Land, 235 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir.
1956); Baetjer v. United States, 143 F.2d 391 (1st Cir. 1944); Wyman v. Lexington & W. C. R.R.,
54 Mass. 316 (1847).
36. Cf. Hickey v. United States, 208 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 919
(1954) (attempting to expand the area of forced sales and excluding even the private business sale
when made under compulsion).
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property, are generally considered inadmissible, even for the purpose of
challenging a witness's credibility.3 7 These offers are inadmissible even if
made voluntarily and in good faith. Certainly the relevance of bona fide
offers to buy the subject property is clear:
When the conduct of others indicating the nature of a salable article consists in
offering this or that sum of money, it creates the phenomena [sic] of value, so-called.
For evidential purposes, Sale-Value is nothing more than the nature or quality of the
article as measured by the money which others show themselves willing to lay out in
purchasing it. Their offers of money not merely indicate the value; they are the
value; i.e. since value is merely a standard or measure in figures, those sums taken in
net potential result are that standard.3
Nevertheless, courts consistently cite a multitude of reasons why such
testimony of offers to buy or sell property should be excluded: pure
speculation may have induced the offer; the purchaser may have wanted
the land for some purpose disconnected with its value; the offeror cannot
be cross-examined; or the offer may have been a mere expression of
opinion by one who was without serious intention or who had no
resources .3 Although in individual cases there may very well be merit to
the objections listed, a failure to even consider such evidence indicates a
37. See, e.g., Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341 (1903). See also Annot., 7 A.L.R. 2d 781
(1949); 1 L. ORGEL, supra note 32, § 148; Note, Methods of Proving Land Value, 43 IOWA L. REV.
270 (1958).
38. 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 463, at 503 (3d ed. 1940). See also County of Los Angeles v.
Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 677, 312 P.2d 680, 683 (1957).
39. The following quotation from Los Angeles City High School Dist. v. Kita, 169 Cal. App.
2d 655, 663, 338 P.2d 60, 65 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959) expresses the conventional view:
"Much has been said about the propriety of receiving in evidence unaccepted offers to buy
similar property. An offer to pay a certain amount does not necessarily involve an estimate
that such is its full value and should have been taken into consideration in forming an opinion
of market value. At best, such offers are but expressions of opinion. They are a species of
indirect evidence of the opinion of the offerer as to the value of land. An unaccepted offer
places before the jury an absent person's declaration or opinion of value while depriving the
adverse party of the benefit of cross-examination. The offerer may have such slight knowledge
on the subject as to render his opinion of no value. He may have wanted the land for some
particular purpose disconnected with its value. Pure speculation may have induced the offer, a
willingness to take chances that some new use of the land might later prove profitable. The
person making the offer may not have been competent in a legal sense to express an opinion on
the subject. Offers may be glibly made without serious intention or the required resources. The
offer may contain contingencies, as in the present case. The area for collateral inquiry is far
broader than in the case of consummated sales, as is also the opportunity for collusion and
fraud. The assertion that the offerer tendered his money might give such hearsay opinion more
weight with the jury than an opinion given by a witness before them, not thus supported. If
evidence of an unaccepted offer is to be received, it is important to know whether the offer was
bona fide and made by a man of good judgment acquainted with the value of the property, and
whether made with reference to market value or to supply a particular need or to gratify a
fancy. Unaccepted offers are unsatisfactory, easy of fabrication, and even may be dangerous in
their character."
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very limited confidence in the ability of courts to examine evidence
objectively and to exclude that which requires an excessive amount of
collateral investigation. The result is that in many instances sales of
scant evidentiary value are presented to the trier of fact, while offers that
provide a much more rational basis for valuing the subject property are
excluded out of hand.
What has been said, of course, reflects discontent with the refusal of
courts to hear what is in many cases reliable evidence concerning the
value of property. Realistically, it must be admitted, however, that use of
the fair market value approach with its concomitant reliance on the
market data or comparable sales approach makes inevitable the
evidentiary rules discussed. These exclusionary rules have their origin in
a jury trial atmosphere, which the courts believe compels a high degree of
judicial selectivity. In that regard, more will be said later about possible
alternative tribunals for the setting of just compensation.
B. "Fair Market Value" Minus the Attorney's Fee
While it may be somewhat sacrilegious to say so, the application of
the "fair market value" test in the context of traditional eminent
domain proceedings results more often than is necessary in the hiring of
an attorney, with the result that the attorney's fee must be subtracted
from the amount the landowner receives for his property.40 The following
review of typical condemnation practice demonstrates why an attorney is
so often needed. Very often, especially in condemnation proceedings at
the state level and in those carried out by quasi-public agencies granted
the power of eminent domain, an appraisal is made sometime prior to
the actual contemplated date of taking by either an appraiser who is only
moderately qualified-very frequently an employee of the condemning
agency- or by an independent expert. If the agency is financially unable
to employ an appraiser to reappraise the property as of the date of the
taking, then the deposit that is finally paid into the court, when
settlement with the landowner is not possible, is based on an erroneous
appraisal. The problem is particularly acute when there has been a
steady appreciation in the value of the land from the time of the initial
40. "To require the defendants in this case to pay any portion of their costs necessarily
incidental to the trial of the issues on their part, or any part of the costs of the [condemnor],
would reduce the just compensation awarded by the jury, by a sum equal to that paid by them
for such costs." City & County of San Francisco v. Collins, 98 Cal. 259, 262, 33 P. 56, 57
(1893).
The best study of this problem is contained in Note, Attorneys' Fees in Condemnation
Proceedings, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 694 (1969).
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negotiations for the purchase until the dispute is taken to court. Even if
the landowner was unreasonable in his demands prior to the filing of the
litigation, he may be willing to settle rather than litigate if a new offer is
made based on the realistic value of the land at the date of taking. Where
a new offer is not made, however, the landowner has no choice but to hire
counsel and pay the attorney's fee.
Under the typical arrangement, the attorney's fee is from one-third
to one-half of the amount by which the final award exceeds the
condemnor's deposit or final firm offer. In many instances, the final
award represents the value of the property as of the date of taking. In
these cases, the landowner has been forced to pay a sizeable attorney's
fee to obtain compensation to which even the condemning agency admits
he is entitled."
Public officials, including negotiators for condemnors, are well
aware of the burden that an attorney's fee places upon the recalcitrant
landowner, and it is not at all unusual for them to exploit this obstacle to
litigation to force the landowner to settle out of court. Indeed, recent
studies have shown that in many instances the first offer is less than the
condemning agency's own appraisal.42 As reprehensible as this conduct
may appear, it is not as deplorable as another practice that is sometimes
41. Even when there is a legitimate difference of opinion between the experts employed by the
landowner and those used by the comdemning authority, the net compensation received by the
landowner, if it develops that he is correct and the agency is wrong, must be diminished by the
attorney's fee and other expenses. A few states have enacted statutes which grant the landowner a
measure of protection as to his attorney's fees, most notably Florida, North Dakota, Iowa and
Oregon. For citations to the relevant statutes in these states see Note, supra note 40, at 704-08.
Florida's statute is of special interest:
"The petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the circuit court
including a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by that court." FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 73.091 (Supp. 1970).
"The petitioner shall pay all reasonable costs of the proceedings in the appellate court,
including a reasonable attorney's fee to be assessed by that court, except upon an appeal taken
by a defendant in which the judgment of the trial court shall be affirmed." Id. § 73.13 1(2).
42. See Hearings on S. 1351 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, 36-38 (1968); Hearings on Real
Property Acquisition Practices and Adequacy of Compensation in Federal and Federally Assisted
Programs Before the Select Subcomm. on Real Property Acquisition of the House Comm. on
Public Works, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 368-81, 383-91 (1963); Berger & Rohan, The Nassau County
Study: An Empirical Look Into the Practices of Condemnation, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 430 (1967).
Section 504 E of the proposed Model Eminent Domain Code under consideration by the
Committee on Condemnation Law of the Real Property, Probate and Trust Section provides:
"Where the ultimate award is more than the offer of the condemnor, the Trial Judge shall have
the authority to cause the condemnor to reimburse the condemnee for his. . . attorneys' fees
and other reasonable expense, but his authority shall exist only in those instances where the
Trial Judge finds affirmatively that to do otherwise would invoke serious hardship on the
condemnee ... "
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used. The landowner may be given a firm offer, told that it is a "take it
or leave it" proposition, and notified that it is the agency's intention to
deposit less than the firm offer in court if the offer is rejected. This kind
of high-handedness is of course aided and abetted by the generally
accepted rule that precludes discovery of the opinions of the
condemnor's experts concerning the fair market value of the property.43
The solution to these problems may lie in the appointment of a
"condemnation proctor" or "public defender" for eminent domain
proceedings-a publicly paid, but independent counsel who would
represent the interests of the landowner. One suspects, however, that
empirical experience with such a drastic measure would reveal that the
landowner, in the long run, would be economically better off with private
counsel, with all the attendant expenses, since the independence of public
counsel would seem to be very difficult to preserve. 4  A more reasonable
solution lies in the improvement and modernization of condemnation
procedure.
The fair conclusion from the foregoing would be that the quest for
fair market value in the context of a highly-structured judicial
atmosphere, with the accompanying technical rules of evidence and
procedure, leaves a great deal to be desired. There seems to be general
recognition of this fact. As stated above, any attempt to remove eminent
domain proceedings from the courts is met with stern resistance on the
part of landowners-resistance which, in the long run, is probably
shortsighted.45
43. See City of Chicago v. Harrison-Halsted Bldg. Corp., 11 111. 2d 431, 143 N.E.2d 40
(1957). But cf. United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968). See also Varney, The Use of
Prior Appraisals in Condemnation Cases in ABA SECTION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW. REPORT
OF COMMITtEE ON CONDEMNATION AND CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE 377 (1968). A California
study has shown that unless the award exceeds the offer by $3,000 to $5,000, the unrecoverable costs
of defending such a case will exceed the increase in compensation. 1969 CAL. L. REVisION COMM'N
REP. 128 n.10.
44. Unlike "public defenders" for criminal cases, a condemnation proctor inevitably would
develop the type of close working relationship with the condemning authority and local appraisers
that makes neutrality impossible.
45. See Berger & Rohan, supra note 2, at 440. At least one type of federal condemnation
proceeding, that of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), has partially moved from a commission
type hearing to a jury trial procedure. Section 25 of the Tennessee Valley Authority Act was
amended to abolish the commission system as the sole method for determining just compensation
for TVA takings. Act of September 28, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-536, 80 Stat. 885, amending 16
U.S.C. 83 lx (1964). Since TVA takings are now on the same basis as all other federal condemna-
tion, if the requisite findings can be made, the federal district judge can appoint a commission
under FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(h).
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C. Alternative Tribunals to Ascertain "Fair Market Value"
The deluge of valuation problems caused by use of the fair market
value test is not being handled efficiently or effectively by the courts.
Even if it is assumed that the standard itself should not be rejected, it
seems clear that administration of the test must be reformed. The
removal of eminent domain proceedings from the courts may provide
part of the solution.
Several states have established permanent arbitration tribunals
staffed with experienced personnel as an alternative to the judicial forum
for condemnation proceedings. Along these lines, the American
Arbitration Assocation (AAA) has recently promulgated eminent
domain arbitration rules, 46 and the California Law Revision
Commission (CLRC) has recommended that the State legislature adopt
arbitration rules that provide for the determination of just compensation
by a panel of arbitrators.4 7 Significantly, neither the AAA nor the
CLRC rules provide an alternative to the "fair market value" test.
Given the variables involved and the difficulty of charging lay jurors, the
arbitration expedient seems particularly promising, especially if the
"fair market value" test is retained.
Another procedure that has worked satisfactorily is the use of a
commission appointed by the court. Rule 7 1A(h) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure provides for a jury trial in condemnation cases "unless
the court in its discretion orders that, because of the character, location,
or quantity of the property condemned, or for other reasons in the
interest of justice the issue of compensation shall be determined by a
committee of three persons appointed by it." ' 48 In United States v.
Merz,4' the Supreme Court outlined the standards that district courts
should apply to a commission appointed under rule 7 1A(h), the duties of
the commission in making findings, the duties of the litigants, and the
duties of the district court vis-a-vis the report of the commission.50 The
46. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, EMINENT DOMAIN ARBITRATION RuLEs (1968).
47. 1969 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP. 131.
48. Beginning in 195 1, bills have been introduced in Congress from time to time to strip the
district court of its discretionary power to deny a demand for a jury trial. In support of such
legislation, the American Bar Association argues that jury trial had been enjoyed under the old
conformity act and was improperly taken away by rule 7 IA. See ABA, Report of the Committee on
Amendment of Rule 71A of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 81 A.B.A. REP. 386 (1956).
Interestingly enough, however, the cases that have reached the appellate courts indicate that it is
usually the government, not the landowner, that complains of denial of ajury trial. See, e.g., United
States v. Leavell & Ponder, Inc., 286 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1961); United States v. Chamberlain
Wholesale Grocery Co., 226 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1955).
49. 376 U.S. 192 (1964).
50. Id. at 197-200.
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commission's finding on "fair market value" and just compensation can
be overturned .by the district court only if it is "clearly erroneous." The
preliminary draft of the Model Code on Eminent Domain, prepared by
the Real Property, Probate and Trust Section of the American Bar
Association, however, recommends a more liberal standard of judicial
review of commission decisions. 1 While this position is not surprising in
view of the Bar Association's resistance to the 71A(h) commission, its
reasonableness is subject to the challenge that the right to a trial de novo
before the court reduces the commission proceeding to a waste of time.
IV. A COMPARATIVE STUDY
The foregoing, discussion has been oriented primarily toward the
inequities created by judicial efforts to serve the constitutional mandate
of "just compensation" through the "fair market value" test.
Undoubtedly, many of the problems considered could be more simply
and effectively disposed of by substituting another standard for that of
fair market value. Suggestions of this nature, however, are frequently
met with the charge that any other method of arriving at just
compensation would work an injustice on the public, give a windfall to
the landowners, and deter the undertaking of worthwhile and necessary
public projects. Since this position apparently has been accepted
unquestionably in the United States, it seems appropriate to challenge
the presumption through a comparative examination of eminent domain
policy and methods of valuation in several other countries, including an
examination of procedure where apposite. All of the countries chosen are
nontotalitarian in nature and have governmental systems that protect
the ownership of private property. Moreover, it may be safely assumed
that in these countries public projects requiring the expropriation of
private property occur with regularity and that somehow these societies
have been able to obtain a balance between the rights of the public and
the private property interests of the landowners.
A. Canada
There is in Canada no constitutional principle that private property cannot be
taken without due process of law, like the fifth and fourteenth constitutional
amendments in the United States. It has been said of the Imperial Parliament that it
can do anything except make a man a woman. The Dominion Parliament and the
Provincial Legislatures within their spheres are just as supreme. 'As to the question
whether Parliament has the power to expropriate land for public purposes without
compensation, there cannot be any doubt.'52
51. "The right to appeal [from the commission's finding] shall be absolute and the trial shall
be de novo." Model Code on Eminent Domain § 504 (Prelim. Draft, 1968).
52. G. CHALLIES, THE LAW OF EXPROPRIATION 75 (2d ed. 1963).
[Vol. 24
EMINENT DOMAIN
Despite the Canadian landowner's lack of constitutional protection,
an examination of the cases and the various provincial and federal
Canadian statutes reveals that the landowner is much more likely to be
made whole in Canada than in the United States. The Canadian courts
have repeatedly stated that when private property is taken for public use
"the value to be paid for is the value to the owner. . . not the value to
the taker . . . ."5 The following quotation accurately expresses the
approach of the Canadian courts to the valuation problem:
The principles upon which compensation is assessed when land is taken under
compulsory powers are well settled. The owner receives for the land he gives up [its]
equivalent, i.e. that which [it is] worth to him in money. His property is. .. not
diminished in amount but to that extent it is compulsorily changed in form. But the
equivalent is estimated on the value to him and not on the value to the purchaser,
and hence it has from the first been recognized as an absolute rule that this value is
to be estimated as it stood before the grant of the compulsory powers. The owner is
only to receive compensation based upon the market value of his lands as they stood
before the scheme was authorized by which they are put to public uses. Subject to
that he is entitled to be paid the full price for his lands and any and every element of
value which they possess must be taken into consideration insofar as they increase
the value to himY
As expressed in the recent case of Zeta Psi Elders Association v.
University of Toronto:
The value of a property to its owner is identical in amount with the adverse
value of the entire loss, direct and indirect, that the owner might expect to suffer if
he were to be deprived of the property.
Value to the owner means the price at which the owner would value his property
if he made an intelligent valuation in the light of data available on valuation date.0
In estimating the amount that should be paid to the owner whose
land is taken, the court, arbitrator, or board must consider all the
circumstances in order to determine the sum that will restore the owner
to a position that is as nearly as possible identical to the position he
occupied before the expropriation." In those cases in which there are
buildings or lands of exceptional character, or premises suitable for a
business only under special conditions or by means of a special license,
compensation includes the right to "reinstatement." Reinstatement,
53. See, e.g., Woods Mfg. Co. v. The King, [1951] 2 D.L.R. 465; Belanger v. The King,
[1918] 42 D.L.R. 138; Lucas v. Chesterfield Gas & Water Bd., [1909] 1 K.B. 16 (C.A. 1908).
54. Lucas v. Chesterfield Gas & Water Bd., [1909] 1 K.B. 16 (C.A. 1908), quoted in G.
CHALLIES, supra note 52, at 87.
55. [19671 20.R. 185, 187.
56. Diggon-Hibben Ltd. v. The King, [1949] 4 D.L.R. 785, 787: "The owner at the moment
of expropriation is to be deemed as without title, but all else remaining the same, and the question is
what would he, as a prudent man, at that moment, pay for the property rather than be ejected from
it."
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defined as "placing the owner from whom property is taken in a
substantially equivalent position by means of substituted property,' is
analogous to the American doctrine that allows reproduction costs less
depreciation when there is no comparative market data by which to
arrive at fair market value.
In recent years, the major controversy in Canada has swirled
around the so-called "allowance" for compulsory dispossession.58 While
there are statutes granting recovery for so-called "injurious affection,"',
interest and costs, there apparently is no express statute authorizing the
practice of granting an allowance. 0 The allowance, which ranges from
an average of ten percent to as high as 50 percent, is awarded to the
reluctant landowner simply because he is an unwilling seller. Although it
has often been said that the allowance is granted because of the difficulty
in arriving at value to the owner, recent cases have suggested that it is
awarded to cover the "expense and inconvenience of moving elsewhere,
the loss of benefits enjoyed by the owner due to location of the property
taken and, where a business is carried on which the owner proposes to
continue elsewhere, the loss due to the dislocation of the business carried
on and the loss of profit in the interval before it can be established
elsewhere, moving costs and other unavoidable expenses." 61
While a great many Canadians feel that the existing law gives
landowners only their fair due, a new federal expropriation bill for
Canada has been proposed to correct what some believe to be a
landowner-oriented bias in the law. 62 Bill C 200 would give the
landowner additional power to challenge the necessity of the public
taking, but it would, in a substantial number of cases, substitute the
"fair market value" test for the "value to the landowner" standard.
Although the proposed bill purports to abolish the ten percent allowance
for compulsory taking, it provides for allowances for costs, including
moving costs, expenses, and disturbances, which combined may exceed
the ten percent "allowance."
57. G. CHALLIES, supra note 52, at 153.
58. See Drew v. The Queen, [1961] 29 D.L.R.2d 114; Todd, The 10% Allowance in Assessing
Compensation Payable for Property Expropriated Under Statutory Authority. 2 U.B.C.L. REv.
623 (1958). For a thorough discussion of the "allowance," sometimes called "indemnity for
forceable dispossessions" see G. CHALLIES, supra note 52, at 206.
59. This is another name for severance damages, or, as they are sometimes referred to in
Canada, "consequential damages." See G. CHALLIES, supra note 52, at 131.
60. The earliest case in which the "allowance," an import from England where it was
abandoned in 1919, appeared was Symonds v. Rex, 8 Can. Exch. 319 (1904).
61. Drew v. Regina, [1961] Can. S. Ct. 614, discussed in G. CHALLIES, supra note 52, at 207.




The existing law in Canada accurately describes the English
expropriation law prior to the passage of the Acquisition of Land Act of
1919. The Act abandoned the "value to the owner" rule and provided
that "[t]he value of the land shall. . . be taken to be the amount which
the land if sold in the open market by a willing seller might be expected
to realise." ' No provision is made in the Act for an allowance for the
compulsory nature of an acquisition.
The English law dealing with expropriation of land is best
understood when considered in conjunction with the various planning
acts. 5 The Town and Country Planning Act of 1947,6 as well as earlier
planning and development acts, consisted of a pervasive system and plan
of land use development. This scheme tended to affect the fair market
value of property by severely restricting its potential uses. For some
time, the "open market" value of property could only be computed with
reference to its existing use and any possible deterrents to its
development, including development fees. Now, according to a leading
authority:
Valuation is, in general, to be made not only on the basis of any planning
permissions which at the date of the notice to treat have actually been granted, but
also on the basis of any planning permissions likely to be granted. Thus if the land is
being acquired for some specific purpose, it is to be assumed that planning
permission would be given for that purpose; and it is to be assumed permission
would be given to develop the land in accordance with the development plan. 7
Significantly, the Acquisition of Land Act of 1919 does recognize a
right to compensation for "disturbance," as well as a right to recover
for severance damages, or "injurious affection."" Additionally, when
the land has no market value, the doctrine of reinstatement 9 continues to
apply in England. The various planning acts also recognize that the
previous application of land use controls can, under certain
circumstances, constitute a taking that is compensable under the law.
63. Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act of 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c.
57, § 2, rule 2. Indeed, English cases prior to 1919 are freely cited by the Canadian federal and
provincial courts. 3 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N. REP., RECOMMENDATIONS & STUDIES A-17 (1961).
64. Acquisition of Land (Assessment of Compensation) Act of 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, c.
57, § 2, rule 2. It has been suggested that the "value to the owner" rule may be for various reasons,
more realistic in Canada than in England. Safian, supra note 62, at 307.
65. See Megarry, Compensation for Compulsory Acquisition of Land in England, in LAW
AND LAND 212 (C. Haar ed. 1964).
66. l0&IlGeo.6,c.51.
67. Megarry, supra note 65, at 221.
68. Id. at 222-23.
69. Id.
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C. Sweden
The Swedish Law on Expropriation provides as follows:
Article 7. Compensation shall be made for real estate that is expropriated in
amount corresponding to the value of the real estate, especially with regard to the
comparative value and productive value of the real estate. If a part of the real estate
is expropriated and the remainder sustains damage or encroachment through the
expropriation or the use of the expropriated part, compensation for this shall be
made. If damage otherwise arises for the owner through the expropriation, such
damage shall also be compensated.
Article 8. When deciding on the compensation for real estate, no consideration
shall be given to a change in the value that occurs as a consequence of the
expropriation or the accomplishing of the intended purpose.
Article 9. Ifa part of real estate is expropriated and the expropriation or the use of
the expropriated part 'causes damage or depreciation of the residue, but in another
respect causes it to appreciate, compensation shall be paid only when the
depreciation is greater than the appreciation.
70
The compensation must be paid according to the market price of
the real estate-the price that can be expected through usual transactions
due to the quality, nature, and location of the real estate, without taking
into account unusual or personal circumstances. 71 When deciding
market price, consideration is given primarily to the comparative
value. 72 When deciding on the comparative value, earlier transactions
used for comparison must be representative in location, kind, nature of
the ground, size, age, condition of buildings, and so on, and the prices
compared cannot be outdated.73 Changes resulting from the increase or
decrease of purchase power are also taken into consideration in the
examination of comparable sales. As is the case in all of the countries
studied, the Swedish expropriation law does not, as a general rule,
compensate for sentimental values of the owner. Severance damages,
however, are recognized and compensated.
Article 7 of the Law on Expropriation states that all damages shall
be compensated. This means, for instance, compensation for special
damages, such as loss of business, which frequently remain
uncompensated in the United States. Consistent with general damage
compensation theory, compensation for loss of business requires a
determination of the extent to which the business would have developed,
70. Law of May 12, 1917, concerning the Law on Expropriation, [1969] Sveriges Rikes Lag
BI 14-30 (Swed.). See generally V. Ollikainen, Regulation of Eminent Domain in Sweden,
December 1969 (unpublished private study on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
71. M. HERNMARCK, LUSESKILLING VID EXPROPRIATION FUR TATBEBYGGELSE 103 (2d ed.
1967).
72. Id.at'110.
73. V. Ollikainen, supra note 70, at 2-3.
[Vol. 24
EMINENT DOMAIN
had the expropriation not occurred. This is established by the so-called
"difference principle, ' 74 which requires that the amount of
compensation be decided after comparing business losses that have
occurred in connection with expropriation with those that might have
occurred independently of expropriation. 75 If the business is
discontinued, the compensation is estimated on the basis of the usual
projected net profits. Compensation is also given for goodwill and other
business values. Significantly, expropriation matters are adjudicated in
special expropriation courts on which expropriation technicians serve.
Notwithstanding their specialization, however, the courts apparently
have not been very effective and condemnation proceedings are,
according to the authorities, quite frequently prolonged. 7
D. France
Article 17 of the Declaration of Rights of 1789 as reaffirmed by the
Constitution of 1946 proclaims:
Property being a sacred and inviolable right, no one can be deprived of it unless
a legally established public necessity evidently demands it, and on the condition of a
just and prior indemnity.77
"Just and previous indemnity" has been defined to encompass recovery
for "the entire damage, direct, material and certain, caused by the
condemnation. 78 Precise and complex rules concerning the methods of
evaluating condemned property and the elements of damage have been
established to prevent private persons from making sacrifices for public
purposes. 79 According to the principles established by court practices,
reestablishment of the landowner to the same or similar status is
considered "just."" Although the indemnity must cover the entire
damage caused by the condemnation, it is limited to direct, material, and
74. SVENSKA KOMMUNAL-TEKNISKA F6RENINGEN, EXPROPRIATIONS TEKNIK 375 (1968).
75. Practice attempts are made to calculate the net losses the business may suffer. V.
Ollikainen, supra note 70, at 4.
76. For a discussion of the expropriation courts see V. Ollikainen, supra note 70, at 5. Prior
to 1950, article 7 of the Law of Expropriation required that "just compensaton" be paid for the
voluntary taking of real property. It is generally believed, however, that the change in the wording of
article 7 has not resulted in a change in the basis for estimated compensation. 1948 STATENS
OFFENLIGA UTREDNINGAR No. 4,85.
77. J. BRISSAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PUBLIC LAW 545 (1915).
78. See D. Krivickas, Regulation of Eminent Domain in France I & n.3, December 1969
(unpublished study on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
79. For a complete study of these rules see D. Krivickas, supra note 78.
80. D. Musso, LE NOUVEAU REGIME DE L'EXPROPRIATION ET SES. MODALITES
D'APPLICATION Ml (2d ed. 1965).
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certain damage. Demoralization loss, for example, is excluded.
Although the methods for evaluating condemned property vary
according to the existing use of the property, the basis for the evaluation
is always market value, which is defined as "[tihe value which tribunals
and the Court of Cassation defined as the price for which a reasonable
man agrees to acquire an estate, taking into consideration the market
price of the real estate of the region where the realty is located."'
E. Italy
The Italian Civil Code provides that "[n]o one shall be deprived,
wholly or in part, of his property except for legally declared reasons of
the public interest .... -82 and then only upon the payment of "just
indemnity." This expropriation for the public benefit may be described
as a contribution that the landowner is compelled to make for the
achievement and benefit of all.Y As a result of this approach, there has
been some controversy concerning whether an indemnity should
correspond to the value of the expropriated object or should consist of a
smaller amount in view of the fact that the public need exists.Y The
present Italian expropriation rule, however, is that indemnity should
consist of a just price that has been established by experts exactly as it
would have been established for a sales transaction." In effect, the law
grants full indemnity to the owner as if he were making the sale of his
own free will.17 The paramount intent of the law is to fully satify the just
price; it reflects the need to balance the interest of the public with that of
the private landowner. The indemnity "must exclude an unjust sacrifice
as well as unjustified enrichment."
81. J.M. AUBY, L'EXPROPRIATION POUR LA CAUSE D'UTILITE PUBLIQUE 20 (1968). For an
extensive discussion of evaluation methods in France see F. FERBES & G. SALLES, EXPROPRIATION ET
EVALUATION DES BIENS (2d ed. 1969).
82. A considerable portion of this study is based upon K. Vokopola, Regulation of Eminent
Domain in Italy, December 1969 (unpublished study on file with the Vanderbilt Law Review).
83. The expression "just indemnity," coming immediately after the other preconditions
concerning the declaration of the public interest makes it clear that such payment is the sine qua non
for a lawful exercise of the power of eminent domain.
84. Under Italian legal doctrine it is commonly held that an indemnity for the expropriation
of private property for a declared public interest and need is not a "price," and therefore, does not
constitute a valuable consideration in a transaction of exchange.
85. There is some authority for the latter viewpoint. Constitutional Court Decision No. 61.
reported in 2 REVISTA DI DIRrrO AGRARIO 250 (1957).
86. K. Vokopola, supra note 82, at 5.
87. P. CARUGNO, ESPROPRIAZIONE PER PUBBLICA UTILIT! 309 (6th ed. 1967).
88. K. Vokopola, supra note 82, at 6. See also P. CARUGNO, supra note 87, at 265. There has




In Germany, compensation in eminent domain cases is provided for
in the constitution. The basic expropriation law provides that:
Expropriation shall be admissible only for the well-being of the general public.
It may be effected only by legislation or on the basis of a law which shall regulate the
nature and extent of compensation. The compensation shall be determined after just
consideration of the interests of the general public and the participants. Regarding
the extent of compensation, appeal may be made to the ordinary courts in cases of
dispute.8'
The German Code contains more specific compensation standards;
compensation shall be given for eminent domain and it shall be awarded:
1. For the loss of rights occurring as a consequence of eminent domain;
2. For other damage in property occurring as a consequence of eminent
domain."
Section 93(3) of the Code debits the landowner with any special
benefit that may accrue to remaining properties as a result of the public
project. Section 95 of the Code provides that compensation shall be
ascertained according to the "market value" of the real property to be
expropriated. The Code precludes recovery for "changes in value
which have arisen as a consequence of the impending eminent domain,"
and there is, in addition, a rather peculiar provision that excludes
"increases in value which have occurred after the time when the property
owner could have accepted an equitable purchase or exchange offer made
by the petitioner to avoid the expropriation." This "in terrorem"
provision has not been found in any other country.
Section 96 of the Code authorizes compensation for "other
property damage"-presumably consequential and incidental damages
-and for the "temporary or continuous loss which the previous owner
suffers in his professional activity, business activity, or in the fulfillment
of duties which are basically imputable to him, however, only to the
extent of the expenditures which are necessary to use another property in
the just price contained in this legislation states that the "indemnity due the owners of expropriated
property shall be determined on the basis of the average commercial value or of the rents for the past
ten years." P. CARUGNO, supra note 87, at 309.
89. The Bonn Constitution. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949. For
a general study of evaluation problems in Germany see W. S6lyom-Fekete, Regulation of Eminent
Domain in the Federal Republic of Germany, December 1969 (unpublished study on file with the
Vanderbilt Law Review). According to S6lyom-Fekete, "the literal translation of the term
'Bundesbaugesetz' would be Federal Law on Construction. This Law is a comprehensive code of
urban development planning, and will be referred to as the 'Code'." Id. at I nA.
90. The text of the Code, commentaries thereto, and its implementing statutes may be found
in S. HEITZER & E. OESTREICHER, BUNDESBAUGESETZ (1968).
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the same way as the property to be expropriated was used."" Finally, the
section provides for compensation for necessary moving expenses and
incidental damage to remaining land.
Valuation is rendered by independent "expert commissions" set up
for that specific purpose. Either the condemnee or the condemnor may
request the expert evaluation of the commission. The market value that
the expert commission seeks is explicitly defined by Section 141 of the
Code:
(1) The expert commission shall establish the common value (market value).
(2) The market value shall be determined by the price which can be realized in
the regular business at the time at which the appraisal is made, according to the
qualities and other conditions as well as the location of the piece of real property,
with no regard to special or personal circumstances.
(3) In the case of developed properties, the market values for the land and for
the buildings shall be ascertained separately if this is possible on the basis of
comparative prices; these shall be separately indicated in the expert opinion."
Two rather unusual provisions not encountered elsewhere should
also be noted.13 First, in certain cases, upon the request of the former
owner, compensation must or may be rendered in the form of exchange
property of no higher value than the fair market value of the
expropriated property. This provision is most often invoked when the
property taken is a single-family home. The decision on whether to grant
the request for exchange property rests with the authorities who decided
on the request for eminent domain. The second oddity is that the former
owner of the expropriated property may request that compensation be
paid in regular installments or in a lump sum.
G. Belgium
The complex system of expropriation for the public interest in
Belgium was inherited from France. 4 It dates back to the Declaration of
the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of August 26, 1789. The ideas set
forth in Article 17 of this Declaration 5 were incorporated in the Belgium
Constitution and the Belgium Civil Code.' 6 Belgium has replaced the
91. The tone of the section is set by a provision that "compensation shall be determined after
just consideration of the interests of the public and the affected parties." BGBI § 96, 1, at 341
(1960).
92. Id. § 141.
93. W. S'lyom-Fekete, supra note 89, at 7-8.
94. For a thorough study of expropriation problems in Belgium see V. Stoicoiu, Regulation
of Eminent Domain in Belgium, December 1969 (unpublished study on file with the Vanderbilt Law
Review).
95. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
96. V. Stoicoiu, supra note 94, at 1-2.
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French concept of "public necessity" with the concept of "public
interest.' ' 7 Since the Belgium Code deals only briefly with
condemnation indemnity, expropriation policies have developed
primarily in the case law through broad judicial interpretation of the
legislative mandate that expropriation shall only be effected "with the
condition of a just and previous indemnity."' 8
To be "just," compensation must be full and equitable-it must
cover all damage caused by the expropriation. For writers of the
nineteenth century, it was sufficient if all rights and advantages taken
from the owner by expropriation, as well as any prejudices caused, were
replaced by a pecuniary compensation." More recently it has been said
that "the judge must compare what would be the price without
expropriation and what would happen (to the price) if expropriation
took place. It is the balance of these two situations which constitutes the
loss in an expropriation in which the compensation for expropriation
must pay." 10 Still another view is that a person whose property has been
expropriated should be put, as nearly as possible, in a position to obtain
for himself, with the help of the compensation, the same rights and
advantages as those of which he has been dispossessed. °10
Compensation is not "just" unless it completely indemnifies the
former owner. 1"2 Just compensation is composed of two elements: the
market value of the property and reparation of the prejudice resulting
from the expropriation." 3 The definition of market value as "a price
which could normally be obtained for the property if it were sold publicly
on the day when the court ruled that the administrative formalities had
been completed and ordered the transfer of ownership" is not
surprising." 4 Generally "future value," the potential that the property
has apart from its use at the date of taking, has also been considered. 0 5
Other factors considered in determining just compensation include a
supplemental indemnity for settlement charges to which the landowner is
97. M. VAUTHIER, PRECIS Du DROIT ADMINISTRATIF DE LA BELGIQUE 239, at 290 (1928).
98. L. BELVA. L'ExPROPRIATION POUR CAUSE D'UTILIT PUBLIQUE 987 (1955).
99. V. Stoicoiu, supra note 94, at 8. Compensation must not include more than the prejudices
that are an "immediate and direct" consequence of the exprorriation; here the antecedents in
French law are obvious. See V. Stoicoiu, supra note 94, at 8.
100. 5 REPERTOIRE PRATIQUE Du DROITE BELGE No. 571, 2 (1950), quoted in V. Stoicoiu,
supra note 94, at 9.
101. V. Stoicoiu, supra note 94, at 9.
102. Id. at 10.
103. Id.
104. Id. at II.
105. Id. at 12.
1970]
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
subject in acquiring an equivalent property,"'6 and a "convenience
value. 10 7 The '.convenience value" would appear to be analogous to the
"allowance" of the Canadian law, although it has been stated that
courts refuse to consider "sentimental values."'0 8 If a person is obliged
to suspend his activities at his present location and move to another
place, and in so doing encounters disruptions in his commercial business,
resulting in damage, the Belgium courts and legal writers are in
agreement that this prejudice requires a special indemnity.'
V. CONCLUSION
It is an inescapable conclusion that a delicate balancing is involved
in condemnation cases between public and private interests. Public
funds, on the one hand, are becoming increasingly inadequate to finance
needed public improvements and therefore desperately need to be
safeguarded. On the other hand, private interests plead for increasing
recognition of the elements of damage, some of which are real but many
of which are fancied. Use of the "fair market value" test to strike this
balance of public and private interests has not been satisfactory; its
application has precluded recovery for many elements of actual damage
that accrue as a result of the taking of private land for public use. The
search for "fair market value" is a snipe hunt carried on at midnight on
a moonless landscape.
The hackneyed expression that "there is nothing so powerful as an
idea whose time has come" may very well be apropos here. The decisions
of the United States Supreme Court usually are not very far behind
public sentiment. Already the criticisms of eminent domain procedures
in this country are growing louder and louder. There is an observable
general sentiment that government at all levels owns too much land, and
that there is general insensitivity on the part of public officials to the
suffering wrought by the taking of private property. Heretofore, the
Supreme Court's reading of "just compensation" has involved an
106. Id. at 14.
107. Id. at 15.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377-78 (1946). See also I L.
ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 39 (2d ed. 1953); Weisl & Cohen,
Federal Condemnation Law and the Public Interest, in 1968 INSTITUTE ON EMINENT DOMAIN 45.
109. V. Stoicoiu, supra note 94, at 15-17. If a landowner excepts to the administrative
determination of the amount to be paid for his land and appeals to the courts, the costs in courts of
first instance are paid by the state; but if he appeals further and loses, he must bear the court costs
and other expenses. Id. at 21. Although it has been argued to the contrary, courts have held that
attorneys' fees are not "costs," and that the hiring of a lawyer is purely a voluntary act of the
owner. Id. at 23.
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interpretation of expediency, promoted by public officials who waved
banners of private greed. It is herein predicted that the time is rapidly
approaching when the Supreme Court is going to insist, as a matter of
constitutional law, that the landowner be paid for all he surrenders. The
cases themselves admit that "fair market value" does not indemnify the
landowner. A good case can be made for the proposition that the
elements of damage now denied the landowner on the ground that they
are incapable of measurement, are in fact measurable if the proof is
adduced in a tribunal having expertise in condemnation problems. And,
surely, the argument that allowing presently prescribed damages would
make the costs so high that the public could not pay its own way is going
to be finally met by the response that, if that is the situation, neither can
it ride on the train.
Almost without exception, the foreign countries discussed in this
paper are doing a better job of compensating the deprived landowner
than is the United States. It may be, if the United States is unwilling to
streamline its condemnation procedures and tribunals, that the
"allowance" utilized by Canada is the most feasible solution. It
certainly would go a long way toward allaying the fears and soothing the
irritations that existing evaluation methods and procedures have created.
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